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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 990281-CA 
v. : 
EDWARD DON GREEV : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for attempted theft, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 (1995) and 76-4-102 (Supp. 1998) (attempt) and 
76-6-404 (1995) and 76-6-412(l)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1998) (theft), in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Where the offense of second degree felony theft from the person of another 
contains an element not present in the offense of class B misdemeanor theft involving an 
amount less than $300, did the trial court properly deny defendant's Motion to Dismiss or 
to Reduce Charges under State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969)? 
This Court reviews a trial court's ruling und^r the Shondel rule for correction of 
error, "according no particular deference to the trial court's ruling." State v. Kent, 945 
P.2d 145, 146 (Utah App. 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following determinative statutes are set out ixi Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1998) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 26, 1998, defendant was charged by information with one count of 
robbery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1 )(a) (Supp. 
1998), and one count of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998) [R. 6-7]. 
At the end of his preliminary hearing, defendant moved to have both counts 
dismissed for lack of evidence, stating that there was no evidence on the unlawful 
possession charge and that the State had failed to produce any evidence concerning the 
element of "force or fear" on the robbery charge, concluding that, "if the State chooses to 
file—to file with a theft charge, that's fine" [R. 89:32]. The State agreed at the hearing to 
drop the unlawful possession charge [R. 89:32]. Defendant was bound over on the 
robbery charge [R. 18]. The State later filed an amended information charging defendant 
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with one count of theft from the person of another, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 (1995) and 76-6-412(l)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1998), and one count 
of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998).1 
Defendant then filed a Motion to Dismiss or to Reduce Charges, asserting that, 
under Shondel, his felony theft charge should be reduced to a class B misdemeanor charge 
of theft involving an amount less than $300 [R. 24-29]. After a hearing, the trial court 
denied the motion [R. 41, 90 ]. Defendant then filed Supplemental Authority in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss or to Reduce Charges on January 11, 1999 in which he argued for the 
first time that the phrase, "from the person of another," in the felony theft charge was 
unconstitutionally vague [R. 48]. 
On January 13, 1999, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of 
attempted theft from the person of another, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 and 76-6-412(l)(a)(iv), reserving his right to appeal the trial 
court's ruling on his motion to dismiss [R. 56-63, 64-65, 91:1-14]. See Utah R. Cr. P. 
1 l(i); State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah App. 1988). Defendant was sentenced to a 
prison term of 0 to 5 years, suspended, and was placed on probation [R. 67-69]. 
Defendant timely appealed [R. 73]. 
1
 At defendant's subsequent change of plea hearing, the State agreed that 
this charge had actually been dropped at the preliminary hearing and "[i]f it has not 
been officially, it will again be the State's motion to dismiss it" [R. 91:2]. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 4, 1998, a car carrying four men, including the 22-year old defendant, 
pulled up in front of Murray High School where defendant's friend, Zarah2 Welch, was 
waiting [R. 8; 89: 4, 6, 10, 14-15]. Welch had earlier agreed to break her $50 bill and lend 
defendant "a few dollars" [R. 89: 5, 18]. 
Defendant stepped out of the car, walked up to Welch, and gave her a kiss [R. 
89:21]. He then put his arms around her as if to give her a hug, put his hands into the 
pockets of her jacket, and took her $50 bill [R. 89: 6-7, 20-21]. 
Welch asked defendant to return her money but he just pulled it away from her [R. 
89: 28]. Believing that defendant was just joking, Welch then got into the back seat of the 
car; defendant, however, gestured for her to get back out [R. 89: 29-30]. She did, and 
defendant shut the car door [R. 89: 14, 22, 30]. Welch again asked for her money back 
and tried to grab it from defendant [R. 89:8, 23, 27-28]. Defendant pulled the bill away 
and, with his friends laughing, quickly jumped in the front window of his friend's car, and 
the car took off [R. 89: 8-9, 17, 22-24, 30]. 
Welch ran alongside the car, holding onto the pillar between the front and back 
windows [R. 89: 9, 24-25, 30]. As the car picked up speed, Welch lost her grip and fell 
[R. 89: 9, 24, 30]. She was hit by the back tire of the car and received injuries to her arms 
2
 Throughout the record, the victim's name is variously spelled Zara, Zarah 
and Sara. 
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and legs [R. 89: 9, 24-25]. Defendant and his friends just sped off [R. 89: 24]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Reduce the 
Charges. The Shondel rule does not apply here because establishment of second degree 
felony theft from the person of another requires proof of an element not required to 
establish class B misdemeanor theft of property valued at less than $300, and there is a 
rational basis for the legislative classification distinguishing theft from the person of 
another from theft of property valued at less than $300. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION BECAUSE THE SHONDEL 
RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Dismiss or 
Reduce Charges because "[t]he elements of the theft from a person statute are duplicative 
of the elements fo the theft of property valued at less than $300" and because "theft of 
property valued at less than $300 . . . carries with it a lesser penalty than theft from a 
person." Aplt. Br. at 6. However, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion 
because the Shondel rule—which requires that where two different statutory provisions 
define the same offense, the defendant be sentenced under the provision carrying the lesser 
penalty—does not apply in this case. 
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In State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), the Utah 
Supreme Court decided that, where two penal statutes apply to a particular set of facts 
and the offenses defined by those statutes contain the same elements, the equal 
protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions require that the defendant be 
sentenced only under the statute carrying the lesser penalty. See 453 P.2d at 147-48. 
"[W]here there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two punishments is applicable to 
an offense an accused is entitled to the benefit of the lesser." Id. 
Since Shondel, Utah appellate courts have had frequent opportunity to clarify its 
rule. Without exception, the courts have held that Shondel applies only when the 
offenses at issue contain exactly the same elements. See State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747, 
748 (Utah 1986) ("[T]the question is whether the two statutes at issue proscribe exactly 
the same conduct, i.e., do they contain the same elements?" (emphasis added)); State v. 
Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985) (holding that for Shondel rule to apply, statutes 
must proscribe "the exact same conduct" and be "wholly duplicative as to the elements of 
the crime" (emphasis added)); State v. Giles, 966 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah App. 1998) (stating 
test under Shondel "is whether the 'two statutes are wholly duplicative as to the elements 
of the crime'" (quoting State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985))); State v. Kent, 945 
P.2d 145, 147 (Utah App. 1997) (holding that "if the elements of the crime are not 
identical and the relevant statutes require 'proof of some fact or element not required to 
establish the other/ the statutes do not proscribe the same conduct and [defendant] 'may 
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be charged with the crime carrying the more severe sentence' without violating her due 
process rights under the state and federal constitutions or her equal protection rights under 
ihe federal constitution" (quoting State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah 1981))); see also 
Clark, 632 P.2d at 843) (upholding conviction for theft of livestock even though it 
carried greater sentence than would have conviction for theft if the conviction had been 
based on actual value of the livestock). 
The only requirement in such cases is that the distinction between the offenses be 
rational. See Clark, 632 P.2d at 843-44 ("As long as the legislative classifications are 
not arbitrary, the fact that conduct may violate both a general and a specific provision of 
the criminal laws does not render the legislation unconstitutional, even though one 
violation is subject to a greater sentence."); see also Gomez, 722 P.2d at 749-50 
("Clearly, the legislature has determined that the act of fraudulently 'signing' a card or 
sales slip should be punished more severely than the mere fraudulent use of a financial 
transaction card. The legislature certainly has the power to make such a judgment."); 
State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 987 (Utah App. 1989) (holding that where one statute 
proscribes assaults by prisoners and another proscribes assaults by any person on peace 
officers, there was no constitutional infirmity in charging defendant with offense 
carrying greater sentence since statutes were not "'wholly duplicative as to the elements 
of the crime'" and "'the distinction is manifestly rational.'" (citations omitted)). 
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!• Th* Offenses are not Identical 
Section 76-6-404 of the Utah Code provides that "[a] person commits theft if he 
obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995). Section 76-6-412 then 
defines the classification of theft offenses. It states, in relevant part: 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property . . . is or exceeds $5,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm . . . ; 
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon . . . ; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another. 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less 
than $300. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). Thus, under these statutes, 
the elements of theft from the person of another are: 
(1) defendant obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
(2) over the property 
(3) of another 
(4) from the person of another 
(5) with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
The elements of theft of property valued at less than $300 are: 
(1) defendant obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
(2) over the property 
(3) of another 
(4) with a value less than $300 
(5) with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
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As the emphasized language above indicates, each of these offenses requires proof of an 
element which is distinct from the elements necessary to establish the other offense. 
Proof of theft from the person of another requires proof that the property was taken 
from the person of another; proof of theft involving property with a value less than $300 
does not require such proof. Similarly, proof of theft involving property with a value of 
less than $300 requires proof that the value of the property was less than $300; proof of 
theft from the person of another does not require such proof. They thus do not 
proscribe "the exact same conduct," Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263, and, unless the distinction 
between these two offenses is irrational or arbitrary, defendant "'may be charged with 
the crime carrying the more severe sentence,'" Gomez, 722 P.2d at 750 (quoting Clark, 
632 P.2d at 844). 
2. The Distinction between the Offenses is "Manifestly Rational" 
"
4[W]hen two statutes under consideration do not proscribe the same conduct, . . 
• [the] defendant may be charged with the crime carrying the more severe sentence/ 
even if the defendant could have been charged with the crime carrying the less severe 
sentence, so long as there is a rational basis for the legislative classification." State v. 
Kent, 945 P.2d 145, 147 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841, 844 
(Utah 1981)). Furthermore, "[i]t is not unconstitutional for a state to impose a more 
severe penalty for a particular type of crime than the penalty which is imposed with 
respect to the general category of crimes to which the special crime is related or of 
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which it is a subcategory." Clark, 632 P.2d at 843. 
In Clark, the Utah Supreme Court considered a challenge to a statute 
criminalizing the theft of livestock as a felony regardless of the livestock's market value 
at the time of theft, where conviction for theft based on the value of property stolen 
carried a lesser sentence. The court held that, "in this case the nonreliance on market 
value in determining the punishment for the offense charged is of no constitutional 
significance because the difference between this type of crime and general theft crimes 
rests upon a rational distinction." Id. (holding that distinction is rational because theft 
of livestock is harder to detect than are other forms of theft); see also State v. Gomez, 
722 P.2d 747, 750 (Utah 1986) (holding that, even though "the reason for the distinction 
. . . in the financial card offenses is rather hard to fathom, . . . we cannot say it is 
irrational or arbitrary"). 
In this case, the legislature has attached a greater penalty to theft of property 
from the person of another than to theft of property having a value less than $300.3 
3
 On appeal, defendant asserts that the statutory phrase, "from the person 
of another," is unconstitutionally vague. See Aplt. Br. at 8, 11-13. However, 
defendant did not raise this issue below either in his motion as it was filed with the trial 
court or at the hearing on the motion, at which the trial court made its ruling. See 
Motion to Dismiss or Reduce Charges [R. 24-29] and Transcript of Hearing on Motion 
to Quash [R. 90:1-15]. Defendant first raised this argument in his Supplemental 
Authority in Support of Motion to Dismiss or to Reduce Charges filed almost a month 
later [R. 48]. Under such circumstances, this Court should decline to consider this 
challenge. See State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 961 (Utah App. 1989) (holding where 
defendant fails to request ruling from trial court, "he has waived the issue for purposes 
of appeal"); State v. Amoroso, 975 P.2d 505, 507 (Utah App. 1999) (stating proper 
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The distinction is "manifestly rational." Unlike the latter offense, theft from the person 
of another necessarily involves both a direct violation of the victim's right to be free 
from interference from others and an increased possibility of physical harm to the 
victim. In this case, defendant's theft of the $50 bill from Welch's person and her 
foreseeable attempt to retrieve it resulted in significant injury to her arm and legs. 
Thus, the legislature's decision to attach a greater penalty to the offense of theft from 
the person of another than to the offense of theft of property with a value less than $300 
is "manifestly rational." 
In summary, the trial court's ruling on defendant's motion was proper under 
Shondel and its progeny because the elements necessary to establish theft from the person 
preservation requires party to provide trial court "'with an opportunity to rule on the 
issue's merits'" (citation omitted)). 
Furthermore, this Court will void a law for vagueness only if, "in light of the 
fact that exactitude of language is seldom possible," the law "either forbids or requires 
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." State ex rel. W.C.P., 91A P.2d 
302, 305 (Utah App. 1999) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. 
denied, P.2d (Utah July 20, 1999). In this case, defendant does not explain 
how "from the person of another" is "so unclear as to cause him to be uncertain" as to 
whether that phrase applies when a person wraps his arms around the victim's person, 
reaches into the pockets of the jacket she was wearing, and takes a bill out of one of the 
pockets. State ex rel. W.C.P., 974 P.2d at 307. 
As in State ex rel. W.C.P., "defendant's vagueness argument amounts to a 
fairness argument." Id. Defendant's argument appears to focus on the relatively small 
monetary value of the property taken and his feeling that a felony conviction for such 
conduct is unfair when the same conduct could be prosecuted as a misdemeanor. 
However, "we are all presumed to know the criminal law" and a statute is not 
unconstitutional vague just because "the prosecutor was able to choose which crime 
with which to charge defendant." Id. 
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of another are not identical to those necessary to establish theft of property with a value 
less that $300, and because the legislature's distinction between these two offenses is not 
arbitrary or irrational. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing dip~ussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not 
request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2JD^ day of October, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General Attorney General / 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIKV 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
76-6-404, Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for 
treble damages. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 
76-1-601, at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is 
less than $5,000; 
(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, 
or any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) in a case not amounting to a second-degree felony, the property 
taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, 
sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing animal 
raised for commercial purposes; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or 
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less 
than $300. 
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-413, or 
commits theft of property described in Subsection 76-6-412(l)(bXiii), is civilly 
liable for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
plaintiff, and for costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
